This confirms the strong upward trend in performance of the Journal of Population Economics already documented by the Scopus Cite Score, see LINK. While the Scopus Cite Score measures the contributions of journals with a broader coverage and a more long-term (4 years) basis, the Clarivate Journal Impact Factor 2021 is calculated as citations in 2021 to items published in 2019 and 2020 divided by the number of citable items in 2019 and 2020.
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Was sind die strukturellen Herausforderungen der Beratungsverflechtung von Wissenschaft und Politik? Welche Aufgaben ergeben sich aus der “Zeitenwende” des Ukarinekrieges? Diesen Fragen geht Klaus F. Zimmermann (Universität Bonn, Freie Universität Berlin & Global Labor Organization, GLO) in einem Beitrag für die Wirtschaftliche Freiheit. Das ordnungspolitische Journal am 22. Juni 2022 nach (volle Fassung mit freiem Zugang: LINK, Prepublication hier). Weitere Quellenhinweise finden sich am Ende dieses Posts hier unten.
Diskussionsbeiträge zur Politikberatung:
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THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, The magazine of international economic policy, SPRING 2022 issue
“Global analysts say that the United States and China are in a race to achieve the most advanced technological breakthroughs. The winner will likely dominate the global economy through the end of the century. Sometimes India and Japan are mentioned as third players in this fierce global competition. But the European Union is barely mentioned, if at all……”
The Biggest Loser
Is the European Union on course to become the big loser in the global tech race?
A symposium of views COPY
Featuring commentary by Marco Annunziata, Marjory S. Blumenthal, Marek Dabrowski, James E. Glassman, Joseph V. Kennedy, Michael Lind, Thomas Mirow, Holger Schmieding, Gunther Schnabl, Stan Veuger, and Klaus F. Zimmermann.
Klaus F. Zimmermann
“Europe can no longer stay on the sidelines of U.S.-Chinese hostility to enjoy trade benefits with China. Europe will lose or win together with the United States.
Europe is considered to be lagging behind in the global tech race, in particular while striving for an edge in artificial intelligence innovations. While an invention needs a challenge, innovation requires a large responsive market and risk-open societies. A common observation is that Europe, and Germany in particular, has great inventive capital but less prowess in establishing marketable products than the United States. The recent successful cooperation of Pfizer and BioNTech in the Covid-19 pandemic has shown some elements of this divide. Hence, the established view is that the United States leads in research and development, while Europe relies on talent. A further European deficit is the large dependence on foreign-owned technology providers for artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and 5G technologies.
Under Presidents Obama and Trump, the United States has turned from Europe to Asia to focus on the race with China for the most advanced technological breakthroughs. China has won some legs of this race already. It has announced its challenge to the primacy of the United States (to become number one by 2049), in particular on the technology front. It needs this success to satisfy its enormous need for imported natural resources and nutrition to feed the growing wellbeing of its large population, and to satisfy its ambition for global hegemony.
In the face of a squandered alliance of the United States with Europe, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has been a powerful strategy to access resources and to develop a global market to sell powerful technological innovations. China’s envisioned success badly depends on technology and trade.
The recent Russian military aggression in Ukraine makes China’s strategic partnership with Russia a doubtful venture, damaging the Belt and Road strategy. A world of bipolar globalization with economic decoupling (Zeitenwende) may arise, confronting democracies with autocratic regimes: pushing for a reformed transatlantic alliance by developing trade and innovations internally in more intense and more open common markets while regulating and restricting trade and technological exchange elsewhere. This would weaken the global rise in wellbeing, but may change the nature of the technology race considerably. China could become the big loser, at least in terms of its huge ambitions.
Since the United States needs Europe in the upcoming global political bipolar divide of the world, this requires a revival of common trade and technology policies. Europe can no longer stay on the sidelines of U.S.-Chinese hostility to enjoy trade benefits with China.
The potential of Europe is creativity and inventive capital derived from diversity and huge markets. Examples include cooperation of the London-based artificial intelligence venture InstaDeep with Germany’s BioNTech to identify and fight dangerous virus variants early on. And the European commitment to accelerating the energy transition implies technological advances. Such a reformed transatlantic alliance makes the question of whether the European Union may be the big loser of the tech race largely irrelevant. Europe will lose or win together with the United States. However, this alliance should seek strong collaborations with Japan, South Korea, and India.”
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, The magazine of international economic policy, The Bigest Loser. Is the European Union on course to become the big loser in the global tech race? SPRING 2022 issue, pp. 47-48.
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Unlike impact factors, CiteScore measures the contributions of journals with a broader coverage and more long-term (4 years) basis.
The May 2022 published scores for 2021 are defined as: “CiteScore 2021 counts the citations received in 2018-2021 to articles, reviews, conference papers, book chapters and data papers published in 2018-2021, and divides this by the number of publications published in 2018-2021.”
CiteScore of Scopus for the Journal of Population Economics is now 6.5 in 2021 following 3.9 in 2020.
The CiteScore Rank in 2021: 75/696, Q1 in Economics and Econometrics & 3/124, Q1 in Demography.
The CiteScoreTracker 2022 (June) is already 6.5.
The Journal of Population Economics is in good company:
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Contributions to the Covid-19 debate receive broad attention. The Zimmermann et al. (2020) paper (see below) gets #TopDownloadedArticle status in the journal The World Economy.
The Covid-19 related research includes:
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Professor Klaus F. Zimmermann (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University and GLO) will participate in the events around the “UNU-MERIT: 15 Year Celebration” next week. He contributes to the May Event Series: Research Seminars on May 16, 2022 by reporting about his work on “Economic Preferences”. In particular, he will speak about:
Shyamal Chowdhury, Matthias Sutter & Klaus F. Zimmermann (2022)
Economic Preferences across Generations and Family Clusters: A Large-scale Experiment in a Developing Country
Forthcoming: Journal of Political Economy, September 2022 (vol. 130, no. 9)
Using data from large-scale experiments with entire families for Bangladesh, the research finds that both mothers’ and fathers’ risk, time and social preferences are significantly positively correlated with their children’s economic preferences. Results differ from evidence for rich countries.
Abstract: Our large-scale experiment with 542 families from rural Bangladesh finds substantial intergenerational persistence of economic preferences. Both mothers’ and fathers’ risk, time and social preferences are significantly (and largely to the same degree) positively correlated with their children’s economic preferences, even when controlling for personality traits and socio-economic background. We discuss possible transmission channels and are the first to classify all families into one of two clusters, with either relatively patient, risk-tolerant and pro-social members or relatively impatient, risk averse and spiteful members. Classifications correlate with socio-economic background variables. We find that our results differ from evidence for rich countries.
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GLO Discussion Paper No. 1073, 2022; in print: Journal of Population Economics
Confidential and legal access to abortion and contraception in the United States, 1960-2020 – Download PDF
by Myers, Caitlin Knowles
GLO Fellow Caitlin Myers
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Using data for young Romanians a research paper finds that it is external religiosity that interacts with weaker addictive behaviors like smoking, drinking and using drugs. The study is now published OPEN ACCESS in the Journal of Economics, Management and Religion.
Religiosity, Smoking and Other Addictive Behaviors
by Roman, Monica & Zimmermann, Klaus F. & Plopeanu, Aurelian-Petruș
Published: Journal of Economics, Management and Religion (JEMAR), Vol. 3, No. 2 (2022), 2250001. https://doi.org/10.1142/S2737436X22500017
OPEN ACCESS FREE PDF
Abstract: While under communism the identity-providing religion was suppressed, religiosity is strong today even among the youth in post-communist countries. This provides an appropriate background to investigate how external and internal religiosity relates to risky behaviors like smoking, drinking, and drugs among the young. This study shows that not religion as such or internal religiosity, but largely observable (external) religiosity prevents them from wallowing in those vices. While this is found strongly for both males and females, those females doubting or reflecting religion show a somewhat smaller risky activity.
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Using data from large-scale experiments with entire families for Bangladesh, the research finds that both mothers’ and fathers’ risk, time and social preferences are significantly positively correlated with their children’s economic preferences. Results differ from evidence for rich countries.
Shyamal Chowdhury, Matthias Sutter & Klaus F. Zimmermann (2022)
Economic Preferences across Generations and Family Clusters: A Large-scale Experiment in a Developing Country
Forthcoming: Journal of Political Economy, September 2022 (vol. 130, no. 9)
Abstract: Our large-scale experiment with 542 families from rural Bangladesh finds substantial intergenerational persistence of economic preferences. Both mothers’ and fathers’ risk, time and social preferences are significantly (and largely to the same degree) positively correlated with their children’s economic preferences, even when controlling for personality traits and socio-economic background. We discuss possible transmission channels and are the first to classify all families into one of two clusters, with either relatively patient, risk-tolerant and pro-social members or relatively impatient, risk averse and spiteful members. Classifications correlate with socio-economic background variables. We find that our results differ from evidence for rich countries.
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